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1 Data Sources and Variable Construction
In this section, we provide additional information on our data sources and the construction of
variables.
1.1 Data for Individual-Level Analyses (National Election Studies)
1.1.1 Non-income variable descriptions
In Table 1, we provide descriptions for the non-income variables used in the national-election-
study analyses.
Table 1: Descriptions of non-income variables used in the various national election study analyses.
Variable Label Description Source
V oteIncumbenti,e Binary variable coded to 1 for a respon-
dent indicating they voted for the party
of the incumbent prime minister, and 0
otherwise.
Various election surveys.
ProPartyIDi,e 7-point scale (from -1 to 1) for the U.S.
and a binary variable for the other coun-
tries coded to 1 for a respondent indicat-
ing they identify most closely with the
party of the incumbent prime minister,
and 0 otherwise.
Various election surveys.
Tenurei,e Years the party of the incumbent prime
minister has held the post.
Calculated from Do¨ring and
Manow (2012).
1.1.2 Details of national election studies
United States
For the U.S. we use the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File,
which combines data from every study in that time series. The file includes all variables repeated
and measured reasonably consistently over the years. The ANES time series studies are based
on face-to-face interviews with national probability samples, although some years include over-
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samples of particular demographic groups. Where necessary, we account for these design-based
departures from random sampling using sampling weights provided in the data file. Each election
sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
Canada
Our survey data for Canada largely derive from a data file, prepared by Richard Johnston at
the University of British Columbia, that contains data for selected variables from the Canadian
Election Studies (CES) from 1965 to 2011. This file excludes the 1972 study, which we have
added to the file ourselves. (An excerpt of Johnston’s file containing only those variables used
in the paper, and supplemented with data for 1972, can be obtained from the Dataverse page
for this paper.) Canadian election surveys were generally face-to-face prior to 1988, whereupon
the primary survey mode switched to telephone interviewing. Whenever possible, we rely on
face-to-face interviews conducted immediately following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to
a national probability sample, but excluded the Yukon, the North West Territories and Nunavut.
For most years, the samples are unique cross-sections of respondents. At times, however, we must
rely partly or entirely on members of multi-election panels (e.g., the 1974-1979-1980 panel). In
general, these panels have been “topped up” at each successive wave of interviews with fresh
respondents, in order to render the samples representative of their respective electorates. Where
necessary, we account for design-based departures from random sampling – owing, for instance,
to oversampling of certain demographic groups in some surveys – through the use of sampling
weights supplied by study investigators. Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are
weighted equally, in total.
Sweden
Data from the Swedish Election Study were obtained from the Swedish National Data Service.
The Swedish election-study data are based on face-to-face surveys throughout the sample period
and, whenever possible, we rely on interviews conducted immediately following Election Day.
Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample. Since 1973, the Swedish surveys have
been designed as “rolling two-stage panels,” whereby one-half of the sample at a given election is
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a fresh cross-section to be interviewed in the present and in the subsequent election, and one-half
of the sample are members of a panel initiated at the previous election. For the analyses in the
present paper, we exclude all panelists’ second-wave interviews. Design weights are not available,
so we simply reweight each election sample so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
UK
Data from the British Election Study were obtained from the Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan and, for more recent years, from
the British Election Study. The British election-study data are based on face-to-face surveys
throughout the sample period. Whenever possible, we rely on interviews conducted immediately
following Election Day. Each survey was fielded to a national probability sample, but the studies
generally exclude Northern Ireland.1 For most years, the samples are unique cross-sections of
respondents, although we must rely on members of a multi-election panel for the 1963–1964–1966
election sequence. These panels were “topped up” at each successive wave of interviews with
fresh respondents, in order to render the samples representative of their respective electorates.
The 1964 and 1966 BES samples include sampling weights designed to correct for panel attrition
and mortality, which we utilize in our analyses. More generally, we account for design-based
departures from random sampling — owing, for instance, to oversampling of certain demographic
groups in some surveys — through the use of sampling weights supplied by study investigators.
Each election sample is reweighted so that all years are weighted equally, in total.
1.1.3 Income measures
In Table 2, we detail how we measure mean, top, lower, and middle-income growth rates in the
analyses reported in the main text, indicating the precise income concepts and statistics used.
Data sources are documented in the table’s footnotes. The statistics correspond to notations
defined in Table 2 in the main text.
1Separate Northern Irish studies have been conducted in some years.
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Table 2: Income measures and data sources. Table refers to election-study, individual-level
analyses reported in main text. All income measures exclude capital gains, with the exception
of data drawn from Sweden Yearbooks, for which the source documentation does not explicitly
state that capital gains have been excluded.
Measure U.S. Sweden U.K.2 Canada
Top-
income
Concept Total family
income.3
1968–1979:
Total pre-tax
income (earners).4
1982–2010:
Disposable income
(households).5
Disposable income
(households).
1965–1982:
Pre-tax market
income (adult
individuals).6
1983–2011:
After-tax income
(individual
tax-filers).7
Statistic T5M P95 P95 T5M
Mean-
income
Concept Total family
income.8
1968–1979:
Total pre-tax
income (earners).9
1982–2010:
Disposable income
(households).10
Disposable income
(households).
1965–1976:
Pre-tax market
income (tax
units).11
1977–2011:
After-tax income
(all family units).12
Middle-
income
Concept Total family
income.13
1968–1979:
Total pre-tax
income (earners).14
1982–2010:
Disposable income
(households).15
Disposable income
(households).
1977–2011:
After-tax income
(all family units).16
(Secondary
specifications
limited to
1977–2011.)
Statistic Q3M 1968–1979:
P40–60.
1982–2010:
Q3M.
P50 Q3M
Bottom-
income
Concept Total family
income.17
1968–1979:
Total pre-tax
income (earners).18
1982–2010:
Disposable income
(households).19
Disposable income
(households).
1977–2011:
After-tax income
(all family units).20
(Secondary
specifications
limited to 1977–2011
elections.)
Statistic Q1–2M 1968–1979:
P20.
1982–2010:
Q1–2M.
P20 1977–2011:
Q1–2M.
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2All UK income data come from: Cribb et al. (2013). Income Before Housing Costs sheet.
3Drawn from Census Historical Income Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Per-
cent of Families (All Races), 2014 dollars series, https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/
families/2014/f03AR.xls.
4Thresholds interpolated as described in Section 1.1.4. Data drawn from annual editions of Statistiska
centralbyr˚an(SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table
titled “Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size
of Income”), column “Number of income earners: Total.” Nominal ncome values deflated by CPI found at
http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-area/Prices-and-Consumption/
Consumer-Price-Index/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/Aktuell-Pong/33779/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/
33895/.
5Data from Statistika centralbyr˚an (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975-2011 [Sweden] [2013]”,
http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]. We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles, 1975–
2011,” sheet “Fixed prices.”
6WTID, Canada, “Top 5% Average Income” Series.
7Statistics Canada. Table 204-0001 — High income trends of tax filers in Canada, provinces, territories
and census metropolitan areas (CMA), national thresholds, annual (percent unless otherwise noted), CANSIM
(database), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2040001. Current dollar values deflated,
as recommended by Statscan, using All-items Consumer Price Index (CANSIM table 326-0021).
8We calculate this quantity by dividing line 1 (personal income) in the BEAs NIPA Table 2.1, “Personal Income
and Its Disposition”, (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&
903=58) by the number of families, as indicated in Census Historical Table F-1 (All Races) (https://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls).
9Calculated from data in annual editions of Statistiska centralbyr˚an (SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden,
Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled “Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter
inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”). We calculate the mean income of all
earners from the columns “Number of income earners: Total” and “Total income: Total.” Nominal income values
deflated by CPI found at http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-area/
Prices-and-Consumption/Consumer-Price-Index/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/Aktuell-Pong/33779/
Consumer-Price-Index-CPI/33895/.
10Calculated as mean of decile means from Statistika centralbyr˚an (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable
Income, 1975–2011 [Sweden] [2013]”, http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]. We use Excel file, “Dis-
posable Income by deciles, 1975–2011” sheet “Fixed prices.”
11WTID, Canada, “Average Income per Tax Unit” Series.
12We have calculated the mean of the five quintile average incomes from Statistics Canada. Table 202-0701 —
Market, total and after-tax income, by economic family type and income quintiles, 2011 constant dollars, annual,
CANSIM (database), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2020701.
13Drawn from Census Historical Income Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Per-
cent of Families (All Races), 2014 dollars series, https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/
families/2014/f03AR.xls.
14Thresholds interpolated as described in Section 1.1.4. Data drawn from annual editions of Statistiska cen-
tralbyr˚an(SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled
“Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”),
column “Number of income earners: Total.”
15Data from Statistika centralbyr˚an (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975–2011 [Sweden]
[2013]”, http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]. We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles,
1975–2011” sheet “Fixed prices.”
16Statistics Canada. Table 202-0701 — Market, total and after-tax income, by economic family type and income
quintiles, 2011 constant dollars, annual, CANSIM (database), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=
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We have everywhere preferred measures of disposable or after-tax income over other income
concepts. We have also sought to use income-group means, where possible, rather than quantile
thresholds. We resort to alternative measures, however, where constrained by data availability or
quality. We explain below deviations from these preferred measures.
U.S.
In the U.S., historical data on the incomes of income quantiles are available only for total
(pre-tax) income. This is therefore the income concept that L. M. Bartels (2008) uses, and that
we use as well. However, we depart from Bartels’ measures in two ways.
First, Bartels measures mean income growth as mean disposable personal income. To bring
the mean income measure into closer alignment with the quantile-income measures, we instead
construct a measure of mean total family income, based on BEA measures of personal income
and Census data on the number of families. Unlike Bartels, we thus use the same income concept
– per-family total income – both for mean growth and for quantile growth (top 5%, Q1 and Q3).
Second, Bartels uses measures of growth in income thresholds as his measures of growth for
the top 5% and in the quintiles. To better capture the distribution of income gains between
groups, we instead use measures of growth in the mean income of the top 5% and of the mean
income of bottom and middle quintiles. We lose four elections by making this switch, as the U.S.
quantile-mean data series does not go back as far as the threshold series. Nevertheless, we see
the gain in the fit between measure and concept as worth this loss, and the broad inferences do
not meaningfully change, even with the reduced sample. We also show results based on threshold
eng&id=2020701.
17Drawn from Census Historical Income Table F-3. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Per-
cent of Families (All Races), 2014 dollars series, https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/
families/2014/f03AR.xls.
18Thresholds interpolated as described in Section 1.1.4. Data drawn from annual editions of Statistiska cen-
tralbyr˚an(SCB), Statistical Abstract of Sweden, Stockholm: SCB. In each volume, we have used the table titled
“Inkomsttagare och summa inkomster efter inkomstklass” (“Income Earners and Total Income by Size of Income”),
column “Number of income earners: Total.”
19Data from Statistika centralbyr˚an (SCB) dataset, 2013-07-17, “Disposable Income, 1975–2011 [Sweden]
[2013]”, http://hdl.handle.net/11272/ZCRIM V1 [Version]. We use Excel file, “Disposable Income by deciles,
1975–2011” sheet “Fixed prices.”
20Statistics Canada. Table 202-0701 — Market, total and after-tax income, by economic family type and income
quintiles, 2011 constant dollars, annual, CANSIM (database), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=
eng&id=2020701.
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measures below in the Supplementary Materials.
Canada
Income concept: We use after-tax income measures for Canada where available. As Statscan’s
after-tax income series only goes back to 1983 (for top incomes) and 1977 (for mean and quin-
tiles), we substitute WTID measures of top and mean pre-tax incomes for earlier years. In our
secondary specifications (for low- and middle-income voters), we also limit the sample to the
post-1977 period as we lack quintile-income measures for earlier years.
This implies a shift from pre-tax incomes for the earlier period (as the WTID measures are all
pre-tax) to after-tax incomes for the later period. However, we show in Figures 1 and 2, below,
that WTID measures of mean and top-5% pre-tax income growth line up well against Statscan’s
after-tax measures where these two series overlap.
Further below in the Supplementary Material, we also show results for analyses that use only
growth in after-tax incomes of the relevant income groups (which means limiting ourselves to the
post-1982 period). As with the results reported in the main text, we observe only indifference to
inequality, and not demand for inequality. Thus, the use of pre-tax data from the WTID does
not appear to be affecting our inferences.
Thresholds vs. means: Throughout, we measure growth in the mean incomes of the
relevant income groups.
United Kingdom
All British income measures are measures of disposable household income. The data come from
the spreadsheet entitled “Inequality and Poverty Spreadsheet” that accompanies the Institute for
Fiscal Studies report (Cribb et al., 2013). We focus on the “before housing costs” series for
consistency with the other countries studied here. The underlying data for the spreadsheet are
drawn from the government’s Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the Family Resources Survey
(FRS).
As no data are available for the mean incomes of British income groups, we are forced to
measure growth in thresholds for bottom and middle quantiles and for the 95th percentile.
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Figure 1: Canada: Mean income growth rates over time from alternative sources. Rates computed
from WTID and Statistics Canada tables are closely aligned when they overlap.
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Figure 2: Canada: Top income growth rates over time from alternative sources. Rates computed
from WTID and Statistics Canada tables are closely aligned when they overlap.
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Sweden
Income concept: The Swedish measures used in the main paper are measures of household
disposable income from 1980 on (from Statistics Sweden).
Statistics Sweden’s measures of disposable income of income quantiles do not extend prior to
1980. Prior to the 1980s, we thus apply a linear-interpolation procedure, as described in Section
1.1.4 of the Supplementary Material, to data drawn from annual editions of Sweden Statistical
Abstracts. These data refer to total taxable, before-tax incomes of earners, the only income-
distribution measure available for this period.
Thresholds vs. means: For all income quantiles (the quintiles and the top-5%), pre-1980,
we generally use the procedure described in Section 1.1.4 of the Supplementary Material to linearly
interpolate income thresholds from Sweden Statistical Abstract distributional data.
For the post-1980 period, the income growth measures for quintiles are for growth in the mean
incomes of the relevant quintiles, from Statistics Sweden.
Statistics Sweden also produces measures of the mean income of the top 5% for the post-1980
period. To better capture distributional dynamics between income groups, our preference would
have been to use this series. However, these data appear to be extremely unreliable. Statistics
Sweden reports margins of error for its income-distribution data, and indicates a very large MoE
for the measure of the mean incomes of the top 5% – indeed, so large that it would swamp
actual growth rates. We demonstrate the problem with plots of both the error estimates and the
series itself (against alternative top-income-growth measures) in Figures 3 and 4; the extreme
volatility of this measure is readily apparent. We suspect that the reason for the high volatility
of this series is that it derives from a survey-based measure and is probably highly affected by
fluctuations in the composition of the sample at the very top end of the income scale, where
changes will disproportionately affect the mean.
In contrast, Statistics Sweden’s P95 threshold measure, also displayed in Figures 3 and 4,
is much more stable and precise. This is unsurprising, given that a threshold measure will be
less affected by survey-sampling variability at the very top (i.e., by the number of very rich
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households sampled). Thus, for analyses in the main paper, for the post-1980 period, we use
Statistics Sweden’s P95 measures, rather than their measures of the mean income of the top 5%.
Figure 3: Sweden: top income growth rates from various sources.
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We also note some volatility in Statistics Sweden’s measure of aggregate mean after-tax income
(see Figure 5). We thus wanted to be sure that noise in this measure was not biasing our results
toward a CBEV effect (away from a standard mean-economic-voting effect). In Table 20 below,
we show models using an alternative set of measures drawn from the WTID. The models displayed
here use a measure of the mean (pre-tax) income of the top-5% for the entire period, drawn from
the WTID’s Sweden series. As seen in Figure 3, the WTID mean-top-5% measure tracks the
SCB’s P95 measure quite closely. The models in Table 20 also use WTID’s measure of aggregate
mean-income, in lieu of Statistics Sweden’s measure. As can be seen, the basic inferences do
not change significantly with the use of these WTID measures, with a quite clear demand-for-
inequality emerging here as for the models in the main paper.
We also show in Table 21 of the Supplementary Material the model results when we use
Statistics Sweden’s (very noisy) top-5%-mean measure. The demand-for-inequality disappears in
these analyses.
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Figure 4: Sweden: times series for the margin of error of P95 and T5M as a percentage of the
respective income level.
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Figure 5: Sweden: mean income growth rates from various sources.
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1.1.4 Estimating Income Levels From Swedish Income Distribution Data
For earlier parts of our sample periods for Sweden, direct measures of income levels for the income
quantiles of interest to us (i.e. the various quintiles and the 95th percentile) are not available.
Therefore, for our income series for Sweden, we must combine data on annual income levels for
the income quantiles of interest from two sources. Statistics Sweden (SCB) provides quintile
and 95th percentile disposable income levels from 1975 onwards. For years prior to this, we
use distributional data from Sweden Statistical Abstracts (see Income Sources table), and then
estimate the income levels relevant to our analysis. These distributional data come in the form of
income bands that indicate the upper and lower bounds of each band, as well as the percentage
of the population that falls within each band.21
To calculate the income levels that are of interest to us, we use the following algorithm:
1. Find the income band that contains the income quantile we are interested in.
2. Calculate the proportion (p) of people in the band that, when added to all the people in
the lower bands, would form the cut-off for our income quantile of interest.
3. Estimate the income level for the income quantile of interest as the lower-bound of the
income band plus p times the difference between the upper and lower bounds of the income
band.
We then deflate these nominal income levels, using Swedish CPI data, to obtain real income
levels. As the SCB and our interpolated income series do not match perfectly in terms of under-
lying methodology, we first calculate the growth rates for the two income series, and then merge
the two to yield variables that cover the period 1954–2010 — where preference is given to the
Statistics Sweden data rather than our yearbook-derived data, when we have both available.
21In some cases, we must calculate the percentage from the raw numbers of people in each band.
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1.2 Aggregate-Level TSCS Analyses: Data
Table 3 provides details on the sample used in the aggregate-level, TSCS (15-country) analyses
presented in the paper.
Table 3: Summary, by country, of full sample used for estimating effects of mean- and top-
income growth on incumbent-prime-ministerial-party vote share in aggregate-level TSCS analyses
reported in paper.
Country Election N First Year Last Year
Australia 29 1946 2010
Canada 19 1948 2010
Denmark 22 1950 2007
France 13 1950 2007
Germany 10 1965 1998
Italy 5 1975 1991
Japan 18 1948 2009
Netherlands 13 1951 1997
New Zealand 21 1949 2008
Norway 13 1953 2005
Portugal 5 1991 2004
Spain 8 1982 2007
Sweden 20 1948 2010
U.K. 11 1965 2010
U.S.A. 15 1956 2012
Table 4 provides variable descriptions for our aggregate-level TSCS analyses.
In constructing top-income, mean-income, and top-share measures from WTID datasets, the
exact country data series employed varies depending on availability. Our rule for measuring the
incomes of the top X% is as follows:
1. Use Top X% Average Income series, or where not available. . .
2. Use Top X% Average income, adults, or where not available. . .
3. Use Top X% Average Income (LAD [Longitudinal Administrative Data]), or where not
available. . .
4. Use Top X% Average Income, married couples and single adults.
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Table 4: Descriptions of variables used in the aggregate-level TSCS analyses.
Variable Label Description Source
V oteSharei,e Vote share of party of the incumbent prime
minister
Do¨ring and Manow (2012).
Tenurei,t Years the incumbent party of the incumbent
prime minister has held the post
Calculated from Do¨ring and
Manow (2012).
GrowthMi,t Growth rate of mean-income, as measured by
GDP per capita.
Bolt and van Zanden (2013).
GrowthTXi,t Growth rate of income of the top ‘X’ percent
of the income distribution.
Alvarez et al. (2012).
ShareTXi,t Share of income of the top ‘X’ percent of the
income distribution.
Alvarez et al. (2012).
Unemploymenti,t Unemployment rate. OECD statistics portal.
Inflationi,t Inflation rate Armingeon et al. (2007).
Clarityi,t Clarity of responsibility index based on
Tavits (2007).
Calculated from Do¨ring and
Manow (2012).
Our rule for measuring mean income is as follows:
1. Use Average Income per Tax Unit, or where not available. . .
2. Use Average Income per Adult, or where not available. . .
3. Use Average Income per Tax Unit (adults), or where not available. . .
4. Use Average Income per Tax Unit (married couples and single adults).
Our rule for measuring the income share of the top X% is as follows:
1. Use Top X% Income Share, or where not available. . .
2. Use Top X% Income Share, adults, or where not available. . .
3. Use Top X% Income Share (LAD [Longitudinal Administrative Data]), or where not avail-
able. . .
4. Use Top X% Income Share, tax data, or where not available. . .
5. Use Top X% Income Share (IDS [Income Distribution Survey]), or where not available. . .
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6. Use Top X% Income Share, married couples and single adults.
Following Tavits (2007), Clarityi,t (employed in robustness tests below) is calculated as an
index such that:
Clarityi,t =
[1− Std(ENPi,t)] + [1−Minorityi,t] + Std(Tenurei,t)
3
, (1)
where ENPi,t denotes the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), Minorityi,t
denotes a dummy variable for whether an incumbent government holds only a minority of seats
in the lower house, and Tenurei,t denotes the years for which the party of the incumbent prime
minister has held that post (unininterrupted by anything other than a caretaker government).
The Std(·) function denotes standardization of its argument such that the variable is linearly
rescaled to be ∈ [0, 1], with the sample minimum corresponding to 0 and the sample maximum
to 1. When constructing her measure of ‘clarity of responsibility’, Tavits (2007) also uses data
on parliamentary committee structure, but these data are not available for non-trivial portions
of our sample period, so we do not include them here.
2 The Specification of Our Empirical Models
2.1 Modelling Response to Inequality
The question that we wish to answer in this section is: what is the appropriate specification for
our empirical models in order to test for responses to inequality in vote choice and vote share?
To begin, we define:
∆Inequalityt ≡ GTt −GMt , (2)
where G denotes a growth rate, and M and T denote mean and ‘top’ income, respectively. Thus,
we have defined an inequality metric that is sensitive to differences between a top income group
and the remainder of the population. Where top-income growth is the same as mean income
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growth, there is no change in the relative incomes of the two groups, and so inequality does not
change. Where top-income growth is higher (lower) than mean income growth, the income of the
top group increases (decrease) relative to the non-top group. As top-income growth is included
in mean-income growth, this change in Inequality is larger than it might appear at first because
higher-than-mean growth for the top group mechanically implies lower-than-mean growth for the
remainder.
With (2) in hand, one natural empirical specification would appear to be:
Vi,t = β
′
0 + β
′
1 ·GMt + β′2 ·∆Inequalityt + ′t (3)
= β′0 + β
′
1 ·GMt + β′2 · (GTt −GMt ) + ′t , (4)
where V denotes vote share/choice. As (3) shows, this approach provides a direct estimate of the
effect of changing inequality via β′2, whilst controlling for mean-income growth — which we wish
to do in order to accord with the prevailing economic voting literature. We simply use (2) to
move from (3) to (4). In doing so, it becomes clear that (3) is not such a desirable specification
because it muddies the waters when interpreting the coefficient on mean-growth. Specifically,
differentiating (4) with respect to GMt , we get:
∂Vt
∂GMt
= β′1 − β′2 . (5)
Thus, with this specification, while we directly estimate the effect of changes in inequality, we
cannot perform inferences on the coefficient on mean-income growth (β′1), but must subtract the
top-income growth coefficient, first.
Rather than take this slightly cumbersome approach, we use the same specification adopted
by L. M. Bartels (2008, Chapter 4), and estimate equations of the form:
Vi,t = β0 + β1 ·GMi,t + β2 ·GTi,t + i,t (6)
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Now, it is easy to see that (6) still yields the same direct estimate of the effect of changing
inequality as (3). We can simply differentiate both (6) and (4) with respect to GTt , which yields:
∂Vi,t
∂GTi,t
= β2 = β
′
2 (7)
Furthermore, as noted above, β′2 is also the direct estimate of the effect of changes in Inequalityt.
Finally, if we differentiate (6) with respect to GMt , it is apparent that we can perform inferences
regarding mean-income growth directly from the estimates for a single parameter in the model
(β1):
∂Vi,t
∂GMi,t
= β1 . (8)
2.2 Controlling for Party Identification
Following L. M. Bartels (2008), our model of incumbent voting (Model 1; see section 3 of the
paper) includes a measure of party identification (ProPartyID). Including the measure controls
for confounding between patterns of income growth and the partisan identity of governments,
and also increases the precision of our estimates by soaking up individual-level variation in vote
choice.
One possible concern with this approach is the possibility that party identification, at least
as measured, might mediate the influence of inequality with respect to vote choice. In particular,
GrowthTop5 in an election year may have a short-run negative impact on ProPartyID, which, in
turn, influences vote choice. If so, including ProPartyID in our models might be “masking” a
sensible, but indirect, negative effect of inequality on incumbent support.
In this section, we report parameter estimates for models without a control for ProPartyID.
We further consider whether any differences in findings for models with and without this control
reflect the mediation of inequality-aversion through party identification or, more simply, a corre-
lation (for other reasons) between patterns of income growth and the partisan complexion of gov-
ernments. We adduce several pieces of evidence that the positive relationship between inequality
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and incumbent support in our election-study analyses (captured in the coefficient on GrowthTop5)
does not reflect an anterior, negative relationship between GrowthTop5 and ProPartyID.
We begin by reporting the results of models that exclude party identification. The relevant
analyses are in Tables 5, 8, 6, and 7, respectively, for the U.S., Canada, Sweden and the U.K.
Each table contains five models: as in the paper, for each country we estimate the vote model for
the whole sample and, in separate estimations, for lower- and middle-income earners, controlling
first for mean growth and then for a tercile-specific growth measure. A statistically significant
demand for inequality remains in most settings across three countries: in the whole sample and
among middle-income earners in the U.S.; in the whole sample and among low-income earners in
Sweden; and, among middle-income earners in the U.K. Compared to the models reported in the
main paper, excluding party ID only affects basic findings (i.e., brings p-values on GrowthTop5
above conventional levels of statistical significance) for two samples: low-income voters in the
U.S. and the full electorate in the U.K.
Table 5: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in
American presidential elections (1968–2012), no party-identification control.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.23 0.04 0.00 -0.49 0.19 0.01 -0.49 0.19 0.01 -0.22 0.04 0.00 -0.22 0.04 0.00
GrowthMt 1.52 1.19 0.20 2.71 4.01 0.50 1.53 1.12 0.17
GrowthQ1−2Mt 2.23 1.66 0.18
GrowthQ3Mt 1.13 0.85 0.18
GrowthT5Mt 3.01 0.65 0.00 0.85 3.12 0.78 1.27 2.08 0.54 3.21 0.57 0.00 3.54 0.42 0.00
Intercept 0.37 0.07 0.00 0.80 0.39 0.04 0.82 0.39 0.03 0.32 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.07 0.00
Log Likelihood -49197 -12322 -12316 -15856 -15856
BIC 98432 24677 24665 31746 31747
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
N 14465 3932 3932 4738 4738
N of elections 12 12 12 12 12
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
We speak below to reasons why we believe that including a control for party identification
is appropriate. It is in any case important to note that (a.) the demand-for-inequality results
reported in the paper are mostly robust to the exclusion of this control and (b.) under either
specification, we see almost no evidence of a “sensible” aversion to inequality, among full elec-
torates or low- and middle-income groups. The GrowthTop5 coefficient is negatively signed and
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Table 6: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish
parliamentary elections (1968–2010), no party-identification control.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.41 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.10 0.00
GrowthMt 0.86 4.64 0.85 1.27 3.61 0.72 2.22 5.47 0.69
GrowthQ1−2t 4.29 1.54 0.01
GrowthQ3t 8.63 6.09 0.16
GrowthP95t 5.65 2.93 0.05 4.55 2.51 0.07 4.69 1.54 0.00 5.38 3.13 0.09 2.98 3.60 0.41
Intercept -1.26 0.19 0.00 -1.32 0.17 0.00 -1.22 0.17 0.00 -1.32 0.26 0.00 -1.19 0.24 0.00
Log Likelihood -73462 -24899 -24833 -25001 -24898
BIC 146964 49834 49703 50038 49832
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
N 26213 9188 9188 8950 8950
N of elections 16 16 16 16 16
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
Table 7: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in British
parliamentary elections (1964–2010), no party-identification control.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.23 0.06 0.00 -0.63 0.05 0.00 -0.67 0.09 0.00 -0.36 0.06 0.00 -0.35 0.06 0.00
GrowthMt -5.03 2.64 0.06 -11.84 3.72 0.00 -11.47 2.92 0.00
GrowthP20t -7.37 2.09 0.00
GrowthP50t -6.47 2.00 0.00
GrowthP95t 2.41 1.87 0.20 3.86 2.76 0.16 -2.82 1.21 0.02 6.55 1.79 0.00 3.88 1.92 0.04
Intercept 0.27 0.14 0.04 1.19 0.14 0.00 1.34 0.23 0.00 0.62 0.16 0.00 0.51 0.16 0.00
Log Likelihood -65565 -16028 -16019 -17623 -17668
BIC 131172 32091 32073 35282 35371
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
N 28434 7376 7376 7446 7446
N of elections 12 11 11 11 11
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
Table 8: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in
Canadian parliamentary elections (1965–2011), no party-identification control.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.05 0.07 0.43 0.01 0.07 0.89 0.06 0.05 0.30 -0.02 0.07 0.73 -0.03 0.09 0.77
GrowthMt 4.33 3.42 0.21 4.08 3.71 0.27 5.35 2.80 0.06
GrowthQ1−2t 4.34 2.69 0.11
GrowthQ3t 6.24 6.28 0.32
GrowthT5Mt 3.48 2.89 0.23 2.96 3.18 0.35 5.95 3.32 0.07 2.36 2.99 0.43 2.11 2.16 0.33
Intercept -0.39 0.09 0.00 -0.50 0.09 0.00 -0.67 0.15 0.00 -0.46 0.09 0.00 -0.45 0.08 0.00
Log Likelihood -70468 -17830 -11270 -22315 -13815
BIC 140977 35697 22576 44668 27666
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 32222 8977 6990 10109 7652
N of elections 15 15 11 15 11
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
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statistically significant only among low-income earners in the U.K., and only when controlling for
income growth at the bottom rather than mean growth. Any effect of excluding ProPartyID
from the models is essentially to increase evidence of indifference to, rather than demand for,
inequality.
In sum, under either specification, we find almost no evidence that non-rich voters in the four
countries vote to advance their distributive interests at the ballot box. Equally important, the
aggregate-level TSCS analyses in the paper yield evidence of CBEV—and, in particular, of a
positive demand for inequality—in a much broader OECD context without controlling for party
identification.
The paper’s substantive findings are thus only modestly affected by the choice about whether
to include or exclude party identification in the election-study models. Nonetheless, in the re-
mainder of this section, we address the appropriateness of including this control by considering
whether party identification itself appears to be negatively affected by top-income growth in the
previous year (and, thus, could potentially be mediating a negative effect of inequality on votes
for the incumbent). We point to two key pieces of evidence on this point.
First, we find little indication of a negative correlation between GrowthTop5 and ProPartyID.
Tables 9, 12, 11, and 10 present estimates of models of incumbent party identification containing
GrowthM , GrowthTop5, and log Tenuret, first for the whole sample and then separately for low-
and middle-income earners. In three of the four countries there is not a hint of a relationship —
positive or negative — between top-5-percent income growth and party identification. Only in
the U.S., in Table 9, do we detect a weak (non-statistically-significant) negative relationship. We
note, however, that (as discussed above) findings of demand-for-inequality for the full electorate
and for middle-income voters are robust to the exclusion of a party ID control.
Second, in models of ProPartyID, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients on GrowthTop5
across the four countries are inconsistent with a causal interpretation from the latter to the former,
given broader comparative findings on the stability of party identification. Notwithstanding
ongoing methodological debate about how best to model the stability of party ID (e.g. B. L.
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Table 9: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in American
presidential elections (1968–2012).
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
log Tenuret -0.05 0.07 0.50 -0.18 0.20 0.39 -0.06 0.08 0.49
GrowthMt 1.95 1.93 0.34 3.95 5.83 0.52 1.67 2.35 0.50
GrowthT5Mt -2.16 1.35 0.15 -4.30 4.07 0.32 -2.08 1.64 0.24
Intercept 0.10 0.12 0.42 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.11 0.15 0.45
R2 0.31 0.23 0.25
N 12 12 12
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
Table 10: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in British
parliamentary elections (1964–2010).
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
log Tenuret -0.05 0.03 0.08 -0.20 0.05 0.00 -0.11 0.03 0.00
GrowthMt -0.61 1.26 0.64 -3.41 2.03 0.14 -3.41 1.16 0.02
GrowthP95t 0.23 0.92 0.81 0.77 1.36 0.59 1.82 0.77 0.05
Intercept 0.50 0.07 0.00 0.86 0.12 0.00 0.66 0.07 0.00
R2 0.36 0.74 0.74
N 12 11 11
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
Table 11: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in Swedish
parliamentary elections (1968–2010).
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
log Tenuret 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.15
GrowthMt -0.26 2.14 0.91 -0.20 2.13 0.93 -0.12 2.97 0.97
GrowthP95t 0.66 1.58 0.68 0.17 1.57 0.92 0.87 2.20 0.70
Intercept 0.02 0.07 0.79 0.02 0.07 0.75 0.03 0.09 0.73
R2 0.30 0.28 0.22
N 15 15 15
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
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Table 12: Parameter estimates from OLS models of incumbent party identification in Canadian
parliamentary elections (1965–2011).
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
log Tenuret 0.01 0.04 0.78 0.01 0.04 0.76 0.01 0.04 0.73
GrowthMt 0.12 2.06 0.95 0.97 2.05 0.65 0.07 2.03 0.97
GrowthT5Mt 0.50 1.87 0.80 0.31 1.87 0.87 0.10 1.85 0.96
Intercept 0.28 0.08 0.01 0.25 0.08 0.01 0.27 0.08 0.01
R2 0.03 0.07 0.01
N 15 15 15
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
Bartels et al., 2011; Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009), party identification has been commonly
found to be a more stable orientation in the U.S. than in other advanced democracies (LeDuc,
1981; see also Schickler and Green, 1997). We would thus expect party ID in the United States to
be less susceptible to influence by short-run economic conditions than party ID elsewhere. Yet the
only place where we find a hint of a negative correlation between election-year top-income growth
and pro-incumbent party identification is in the United States (see Table 9) — precisely where
a substantial causal effect on party ID is least plausible. Not only is the correlation between
GrowthTop5 and ProPartyID in the U.S. weak, but the cross-national pattern of correlations
also cuts against the possibility that any such correlation reflects endogeneity of ProPartyID to
election-year top-income growth.
In sum, (a.) the choice about the inclusion or exclusion of a party-identification control is only
modestly consequential for our conclusions, and (b.) we can find little evidence that its inclusion
could plausibly be masking a negative effect of inequality on votes for the incumbent.
3 Moderation of Individual-Level Results by Top-Income
Shares
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Table 13: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in
American presidential elections (1968–2012). ShareT5 moderates the effect of GrowthT5M in the
full sample and among middle-income earners.
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.31 0.07 0.00 -0.45 0.08 0.00 -0.29 0.06 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 1.69 0.08 0.00 1.63 0.08 0.00 1.69 0.08 0.00
GrowthMt -13.46 4.00 0.00 -15.42 1.77 0.00 -14.75 5.27 0.01
ShareT5t -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.53 -0.04 0.01 0.00
GrowthT5Mt 37.12 3.94 0.00 20.13 5.78 0.00 40.02 4.61 0.00
ShareT5t ×GrowthT5t -1.37 0.22 0.00 -0.36 0.35 0.30 -1.50 0.27 0.00
Intercept 1.20 0.21 0.00 1.17 0.16 0.00 1.35 0.25 0.00
Log Likelihood -27771 -7042 -9045
BIC 55609 14143 18149
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.44 0.44
N 14465 3932 4738
N of elections 12 12 12
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
Table 14: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in
Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010). ShareT5 moderates the effect of GrowthP95 in the
full sample and among middle-income earners.
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.10 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 2.61 0.10 0.00 2.55 0.11 0.00 2.58 0.15 0.00
GrowthMt -5.37 2.50 0.03 -4.09 2.39 0.09 -3.69 3.60 0.30
GrowthP95t 54.76 10.40 0.00 43.30 9.68 0.00 48.08 14.49 0.00
ShareT5t 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05
ShareT5t ×GrowthP95t -3.02 0.58 0.00 -2.32 0.53 0.00 -2.65 0.81 0.00
Intercept -2.44 0.31 0.00 -2.00 0.21 0.00 -2.48 0.44 0.00
Log Likelihood -49330 -16444 -16712
BIC 98730 32951 33486
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.31
N 22690 7797 7830
N of elections 15 15 15
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
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Table 15: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in
British parliamentary elections (1964–2010). Here we do not find the same moderating effect
of ShareT5 as in the aggregate-level TSCS analysis; indeed there is a moderating effect in the
opposite direction.
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.22 0.07 0.00 -0.48 0.07 0.00 -0.25 0.08 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 2.64 0.06 0.00 2.69 0.10 0.00 2.61 0.08 0.00
GrowthMt -9.08 2.76 0.00 -10.11 2.67 0.00 -8.91 3.17 0.00
ShareT5t -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.77 -0.03 0.01 0.04
GrowthP95t -9.98 4.22 0.02 -2.90 4.17 0.49 -7.13 6.16 0.25
ShareT5t ×GrowthT5t 0.69 0.22 0.00 0.40 0.17 0.02 0.61 0.29 0.04
Intercept -0.21 0.23 0.36 -0.26 0.28 0.35 -0.19 0.33 0.55
Log Likelihood -29953 -7057 -8169
BIC 59977 14175 16400
Pseudo R2 0.55 0.58 0.54
N 28402 7374 7435
N of elections 12 11 11
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
Table 16: Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in
Canadian parliamentary elections (1965–2011). ShareT5 moderates the effect of GrowthT5M in
the full sample and among middle-income earners.
(1) (2) (3)
b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.06 0.07 0.38 0.01 0.06 0.82 -0.02 0.10 0.87
ProPartyIDi,t 1.95 0.14 0.00 2.04 0.21 0.00 2.01 0.15 0.00
GrowthMt 5.80 2.67 0.03 6.01 2.47 0.01 7.85 4.08 0.05
ShareT5t 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.28
GrowthT5Mt 53.43 22.02 0.02 24.49 25.91 0.34 51.89 25.14 0.04
ShareT5t ×GrowthT5Mt -1.97 0.87 0.02 -0.89 1.04 0.39 -1.94 1.00 0.05
Intercept -2.24 0.82 0.01 -2.08 0.73 0.00 -2.10 0.89 0.02
Log Likelihood -46670 -11401 -14760
BIC 93412 22866 29584
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.36 0.34
N 31623 8794 9951
N of elections 15 15 15
Income tercile(s) All Low Mid
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4 Robustness Tests: Individual-Level Analyses
In this section, we present a range of results that demonstrate the robustness of our inferences to
various modelling choices. Table captions document these findings.
4.1 The U.S.
Table 17: U.S.: Using income thresholds, rather than group means. Probit estimates
of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in American presidential elections
(1952–2012). Substituting measures of growth in income percentiles for measures of mean growth
within quantiles, which also adds four earlier elections to the analysis, does not affect inferences
of a demand for inequality. Quantile threshold data come from Census Historical Table F-1 (All
Races), https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.36 0.11 0.00 -0.44 0.11 0.00 -0.44 0.10 0.00 -0.33 0.11 0.00 -0.30 0.10 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 1.59 0.06 0.00 1.53 0.06 0.00 1.54 0.06 0.00 1.57 0.07 0.00 1.60 0.07 0.00
GrowthMt -2.14 5.22 0.68 -3.89 5.34 0.47 0.38 5.74 0.95
GrowthP20t -3.65 1.64 0.03
GrowthP40−60t -7.50 2.93 0.01
GrowthP95t 11.64 1.49 0.00 11.64 2.10 0.00 14.38 2.52 0.00 11.15 2.40 0.00 18.80 3.29 0.00
Intercept 0.61 0.30 0.05 0.78 0.28 0.01 0.68 0.22 0.00 0.45 0.26 0.09 0.41 0.21 0.05
Log Likelihood -40172 -10519 -10496 -12592 -12535
BIC 80393 21080 21035 25228 25114
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41
N 18975 5244 5244 5947 5947
N of elections 16 16 16 16 16
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
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Table 18: U.S.: Alternative measure of income growth at the bottom. Probit es-
timates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in American pres-
idential elections (1968–2012). Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income,
rather than mean growth of the bottom-40 percent, does not affect the inference regarding
GrowthT5M . Quantile threshold data come from Census Historical Table F-1 (All Races),
https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/families/2014/f01AR.xls
(1)
b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.47 0.11 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 1.61 0.08 0.00
GrowthP20t -3.78 0.75 0.00
GrowthT5Mt 9.87 1.01 0.00
Intercept 0.70 0.21 0.00
Log Likelihood -7073
BIC 14188
Pseudo R2 0.44
N 3932
N of elections 12
Income tercile(s) Low
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4.2 Sweden
Table 19: Sweden: Use of linear vs. logged Tenure. Probit estimates of coefficients for
predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–2010).
GrowthT5t and Growth
M
t inferences are affected by use of log Tenuret as opposed to Tenuret, but
our decision to use the former in the main text, for consistency with the other country analyses,
biases against the inference of a positive effect from GrowthT5t .
(1) (2)
b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
Tenuret 0.02 0.00 0.00
log Tenuret 0.25 0.05 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 2.61 0.10 0.00 2.62 0.10 0.00
GrowthMt -1.72 3.54 0.63 0.26 4.16 0.95
GrowthP95t 7.29 2.62 0.01 5.18 2.71 0.06
Intercept -1.12 0.10 0.00 -1.37 0.15 0.00
Log Likelihood -49660 -49678
BIC 99370 99407
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28
N 22690 22690
N of elections 15 15
Income tercile(s) All All
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Table 20: Sweden: Alternative measure of top-income growth. Probit estimates of co-
efficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections
(1968–2010). Using solely WTID measures for mean and top-5% (“Top 5% Average Income Per
Tax Unit” series) income growth, a clear demand-for-inequality remains in the full sample and
among low-income earners.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret 0.24 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.28 0.07 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 2.61 0.09 0.00 2.56 0.11 0.00 2.55 0.11 0.00 2.60 0.14 0.00 2.58 0.14 0.00
GrowthMt 4.03 2.71 0.14 0.59 2.57 0.82 8.46 2.95 0.00
GrowthQ1−2t 5.08 0.96 0.00
GrowthQ3t 7.72 4.27 0.07
GrowthT5Mt 4.26 1.49 0.00 4.21 1.27 0.00 4.27 1.21 0.00 2.49 1.60 0.12 2.32 2.07 0.26
Intercept -1.38 0.17 0.00 -1.40 0.15 0.00 -1.30 0.11 0.00 -1.50 0.21 0.00 -1.39 0.17 0.00
Log Likelihood -49636 -16547 -16472 -16739 -16745
BIC 99322 33139 32988 33522 33535
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31
N 22690 7797 7797 7830 7830
N of elections 15 15 15 15 15
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
Table 21: Sweden: Using volatile SCB top-income measure. Probit estimates of coeffi-
cients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary elections (1968–
2010). Substituting Statistics Sweden’s highly volatile top-5 mean growth measure for Statistics
Sweden’s P95 growth rates after 1980 eliminates the demand-for-inequality effect in this case.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.01
ProPartyIDi,t 2.61 0.10 0.00 2.56 0.11 0.00 2.56 0.11 0.00 2.58 0.14 0.00 2.58 0.14 0.00
GrowthMt 9.78 4.13 0.02 7.53 3.09 0.01 13.61 4.38 0.00
GrowthQ1−2t 5.27 1.46 0.00
GrowthQ3t 11.95 3.93 0.00
GrowthT5t -1.52 1.26 0.23 -0.60 1.07 0.58 1.37 0.53 0.01 -3.20 1.24 0.01 -1.33 0.84 0.11
Intercept -1.23 0.16 0.00 -1.33 0.13 0.00 -1.25 0.15 0.00 -1.29 0.15 0.00 -1.22 0.16 0.00
Log Likelihood -49737 -16541 -16533 -16715 -16729
BIC 99523 33128 33110 33475 33503
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31
N 22690 7797 7797 7830 7830
N of elections 15 15 15 15 15
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
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Table 22: Sweden: Using alternative measure of income growth at bottom. Probit
estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Swedish parliamentary
elections (1968–2010). Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income, rather than a
mixture of mean growth of the bottom-40 percent and growth at the 20th percentile, does not
affect the inference regarding GrowthT5M . GrowthP20t is measured using the linear interpolation
procedure described in section 1.1.4.
(1)
b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret 0.21 0.03 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 2.54 0.11 0.00
GrowthP20t 3.43 0.98 0.00
GrowthP95t 4.78 0.90 0.00
Intercept -1.42 0.09 0.00
Log Likelihood -16348
BIC 32740
Pseudo R2 0.28
N 7700
N of elections 14
Income tercile(s) Low
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4.3 The U.K.
Table 23: U.K.: Using logged vs. linear Tenure. Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors
of voting for the incumbent party in British parliamentary elections (1964–2010). GrowthT5t and
GrowthMt inferences are not meaningfully affected by use of log Tenuret as opposed to Tenuret.
(1) (2)
b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
Tenuret -0.03 0.01 0.00
log Tenuret -0.28 0.06 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 2.63 0.06 0.00 2.64 0.06 0.00
GrowthMt -5.41 3.22 0.09 -8.33 2.48 0.00
GrowthP95t 2.48 2.75 0.37 4.45 2.30 0.05
Intercept -1.01 0.09 0.00 -0.71 0.12 0.00
Log Likelihood -30095 -30032
BIC 60241 60115
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.54
N 28402 28402
N of elections 12 12
Income tercile(s) All All
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4.4 Canada
Table 24: Canada: Using linear, rather than logged, term for Tenure. Probit estimates
of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elec-
tions (1968–2011). GrowthT5Mt and Growth
M
t inferences are not meaningfully affected by use of
log Tenuret as opposed to Tenuret.
(1) (2)
b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
Tenuret -0.02 0.01 0.15
log Tenuret -0.10 0.06 0.12
ProPartyIDi,t 1.95 0.14 0.00 1.94 0.14 0.00
GrowthMt 8.23 3.27 0.01 8.07 3.40 0.02
GrowthT5Mt 2.72 3.16 0.39 3.13 3.15 0.32
Intercept -1.08 0.14 0.00 -1.05 0.14 0.00
Log Likelihood -46869 -46890
BIC 93791 93832
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.33
N 31623 31623
N of elections 15 15
Income tercile(s) All All
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Table 25: Canada: Comparing primary and secondary specification results for low-
and middle-income voters. Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the
incumbent party in Canadian parliamentary elections (1979–2011). The results in this table
speak to the demand-for-inequality results that appear only in our secondary specifications for
low- and middle-income voters (as shown in models 3 and 5 in the paper). As the secondary
models are estimated on a truncated sample of elections, as compared to our primary models for
these voters, the question arises as to whether the difference in results arises from differences in
the sample or from differences in the model specification. As we see below, we continue to find
indifference to inequality in our primary specification, even when we restrict the sample to that
employed for our secondary specification. Moreover, comparing BIC statistics within each pair of
models reveals that the best fit — for both low- and middle-income earners — is provided when
controlling for mean, rather than tercile-specific, income growth. For this reason, we emphasize
the mean-growth specification in the paper (i.e., we conclude that Canadians are indifferent to
inequality).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.00 0.06 0.97 -0.06 0.05 0.25 -0.14 0.07 0.03 -0.16 0.06 0.01
ProPartyIDi,t 2.04 0.18 0.00 2.05 0.19 0.00 1.95 0.16 0.00 1.95 0.16 0.00
GrowthMt 20.22 5.76 0.00 17.80 6.37 0.01
GrowthQ1−2t 2.76 2.59 0.29
GrowthQ3t 8.21 5.51 0.14
GrowthT5Mt 6.45 3.18 0.04 -0.85 2.96 0.77 3.39 2.07 0.10 0.22 3.43 0.95
Intercept -1.28 0.21 0.00 -1.14 0.13 0.00 -0.99 0.12 0.00 -0.99 0.14 0.00
Log Likelihood -7062 -6976 -9048 -8970
BIC 14168 13997 18140 17984
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.34
N 6832 6832 7527 7527
N of elections 11 11 11 11
Income tercile(s) Low Low Mid Mid
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Table 26: Canada: Using only after-tax income measures, rather than mix of pre-
and after-tax. Probit estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party
in Canadian parliamentary elections (1983–2011). Confining the analysis to elections for which
Statscan’s after-tax income measures are available for all income statistics does not affect infer-
ences for GrowthT5M or GrowthM .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.24 0.12 0.04 -0.11 0.11 0.32 -0.24 0.11 0.03 -0.24 0.12 0.04 -0.31 0.11 0.00
ProPartyIDi,t 1.71 0.10 0.00 1.76 0.13 0.00 1.76 0.12 0.00 1.73 0.09 0.00 1.72 0.08 0.00
GrowthMt 12.98 6.71 0.05 16.25 6.44 0.01 11.72 6.47 0.07
GrowthQ1−2t -0.39 3.60 0.91
GrowthQ3t 4.93 4.32 0.25
GrowthT5Mt 3.06 3.34 0.36 1.26 3.10 0.68 7.56 2.55 0.00 3.11 3.29 0.34 5.70 2.18 0.01
Intercept -0.79 0.23 0.00 -1.00 0.21 0.00 -0.80 0.23 0.00 -0.81 0.22 0.00 -0.70 0.20 0.00
Log Likelihood -25486 -5410 -5450 -7303 -7323
BIC 51022 10864 10943 14649 14690
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29
N 21223 5656 5656 6408 6408
N of elections 9 9 9 9 9
Income tercile(s) All Low Low Mid Mid
Table 27: Canada: Using alternative measure of income growth at the bottom. Probit
estimates of coefficients for predictors of voting for the incumbent party in Canadian parliamen-
tary elections (1979–2011). Controlling for growth at the 20th percentile of income, rather than
a mixture of mean growth of the bottom-40 percent and growth at the 20th percentile, does not
affect the inference regarding GrowthT5M .
(1)
b se p
V oteIncumbenti,t
log Tenuret -0.01 0.05 0.91
ProPartyIDi,t 2.05 0.18 0.00
GrowthP20t 11.70 4.76 0.01
GrowthT5Mt 3.50 2.41 0.15
Intercept -1.27 0.17 0.00
Log Likelihood -7010
BIC 14065
Pseudo R2 0.37
N 6832
N of elections 11
Income tercile(s) Low
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5 Robustness Tests: Aggregate-level TSCS Analyses
In this section, we present a range of results that demonstrate the robustness of our inferences to
specification choices, as well as a large selection of additional control variables. Table captions
document these findings.
Table 28: TSCS: Using linear vs. logged Tenure. Model fit is worse when using Tenurei,t
rather than log Tenurei,t (as we do in the main text). However the moderating effect of Share
T5
t
remains strongly evident under this alternative specification.
(1) (2)
b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.18 0.04 0.00
Tenurei,t -0.04 0.06 0.47 -0.04 0.06 0.55
GrowthMi,t 22.06 9.79 0.04 26.68 10.02 0.02
GrowthT5Mi,t 16.01 10.33 0.14 93.21 32.02 0.01
ShareT5i,t -0.02 0.06 0.74
ShareT5i,t ×GrowthT5Mi,t -3.57 1.53 0.04
Intercept 4.58 1.34 0.00 4.67 1.99 0.03
R2 0.12 0.13
BIC 1442 1380
N 225 213
N countries 15 15
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry
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Table 29: TSCS: Country-level jackknife standard errors. The finding of moderation of
the effect of GrowthT5i,t by Share
T5
i,t is robust to calculation of standard errors on the basis of
country-level jackknife analysis.
(1) (2)
b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00
log Tenurei,t -1.08 0.45 0.03 -1.02 0.50 0.06
GrowthMi,t 20.60 11.52 0.10 25.14 11.30 0.04
GrowthT5Mi,t 16.31 10.62 0.15 87.98 37.28 0.03
ShareT5i,t -0.01 0.07 0.85
ShareT5i,t ×GrowthT5Mi,t -3.34 1.90 0.10
Intercept 4.85 1.49 0.01 4.78 2.24 0.05
R2 0.15 0.15
BIC 1436 1374
N 225 213
N countries 15 15
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry
Std. error type Jknife Jknife
Table 30: TSCS: Alternative “top-income” thresholds. The finding of moderation of the
effect of top-income growth is present when we define “top-income” to be that of the top 0.1%;
it is not statistically significant for the top 10%, that is, we estimate a significant demand for
inequality irrespective of the income share of the top 10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.15 0.03 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00
log Tenurei,t -1.07 0.43 0.02 -1.01 0.47 0.05 -1.03 0.43 0.03 -0.98 0.47 0.05
GrowthMi,t 15.80 8.68 0.09 21.88 9.86 0.04 35.53 14.00 0.02 40.89 16.06 0.02
GrowthT10Mi,t 25.01 9.93 0.02 78.71 43.36 0.09
ShareT10i,t -0.04 0.05 0.45
ShareT10i,t ×GrowthT10Mi,t -1.74 1.54 0.28
GrowthT0.1Mi,t -0.94 2.34 0.69 8.63 4.34 0.07
ShareT0.1i,t 0.30 0.13 0.04
ShareT0.1i,t ×GrowthT0.1Mi,t -3.45 1.07 0.01
Intercept 4.85 1.40 0.00 5.52 2.29 0.03 4.40 1.25 0.00 3.74 1.29 0.01
R2 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.13
BIC 1490 1431 1425 1353
N 235 223 224 210
N countries 16 16 16 16
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
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Table 31: TSCS: Controlling for unemployment and inflation. The finding of moderation
of the effect of GrowthT5i,t by Share
T5
i,t is robust to inclusion of the unemployment rate, as well as
the change in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.17 0.04 0.00 -0.18 0.05 0.00 -0.20 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.05 0.00
log Tenurei,t -1.08 0.60 0.09 -1.03 0.65 0.14 -0.95 0.63 0.15 -0.87 0.70 0.24
Unemploymenti,t -0.22 0.12 0.10 -0.20 0.12 0.11 -0.13 0.10 0.24 -0.11 0.10 0.30
GrowthMi,t 42.98 14.54 0.01 54.96 13.50 0.00 43.93 16.99 0.02 49.39 18.48 0.02
GrowthT5Mi,t 9.88 9.35 0.31 76.82 25.21 0.01 3.01 6.78 0.66 77.63 33.50 0.04
ShareT5i,t 0.04 0.07 0.57 0.01 0.10 0.94
ShareT5i,t ×GrowthT5Mi,t -3.13 1.30 0.03 -3.25 1.57 0.06
∆Unemploymenti,t -0.60 0.26 0.04 -0.70 0.28 0.02
Inflationi,t 0.06 0.11 0.63 0.07 0.13 0.58
Intercept 6.12 2.14 0.01 5.25 2.64 0.07 6.38 1.95 0.01 5.81 2.72 0.05
R2 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.23
BIC 1274 1223 1200 1147
N 199 189 187 177
N countries 15 15 15 15
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
Table 32: TSCS: Country fixed and random effects. The finding of moderation of the effect
of GrowthT5i,t by Share
T5
i,t is robust to the inclusion of country fixed or random effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.18 0.06 0.01 -0.20 0.06 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.04 0.00
log Tenurei,t -1.34 0.49 0.02 -1.21 0.54 0.04 -1.08 0.44 0.02 -1.02 0.48 0.04
GrowthMi,t 22.53 9.95 0.04 28.98 11.33 0.02 20.60 10.40 0.05 25.14 10.66 0.02
GrowthT5Mi,t 14.92 8.27 0.09 76.11 31.60 0.03 16.31 9.53 0.09 87.98 29.92 0.00
ShareT5i,t 0.06 0.12 0.63 -0.01 0.06 0.82
ShareT5i,t ×GrowthT5Mi,t -2.95 1.58 0.08 -3.34 1.46 0.02
Intercept 6.25 2.43 0.02 5.42 4.12 0.21 4.85 1.41 0.00 4.78 1.86 0.01
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
BIC 1416 1357 . .
N 225 213 225 213
N countries 15 15 15 15
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
Unit effects fe fe re re
Unit Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
37
Table 33: TSCS: Party fixed and random effects.The finding of moderation of the effect of
GrowthT5i,t by Share
T5
i,t is robust to the inclusion of party random, though not fixed, effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.50 0.08 0.00 -0.52 0.08 0.00 -0.21 0.04 0.00 -0.22 0.04 0.00
log Tenurei,t -1.43 0.68 0.05 -1.28 0.73 0.10 -1.44 0.58 0.01 -1.32 0.62 0.03
GrowthMi,t 41.10 15.27 0.02 46.21 16.54 0.01 22.45 11.00 0.04 27.78 12.33 0.02
GrowthT5Mi,t 20.67 12.94 0.13 48.21 46.28 0.32 18.50 9.76 0.06 76.97 32.44 0.02
ShareT5i,t -0.05 0.11 0.62 0.04 0.07 0.56
ShareT5i,t ×GrowthT5Mi,t -1.28 2.35 0.59 -2.79 1.59 0.08
Intercept 18.77 3.27 0.00 20.17 4.02 0.00 6.80 1.75 0.00 6.00 2.46 0.01
R2 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15
BIC 1342 1290 . .
N 225 213 225 213
N countries 15 15 15 15
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
Unit effects fe fe re re
Unit Party Party Party Party
Table 34: TSCS: Time trend and clarity of responsibility. The finding of moderation of
the effect of GrowthT5i,t by Share
T5
i,t is robust to the inclusion of a year trend, and also to the
inclusion of a measure of ‘clarity of responsibility’ interacted with GrowthMi,t . See notes above for
full details of how Clarityi,t is calculated.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b se p b se p b se p b se p
V oteSharePMi,e−1 -0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.14 0.03 0.00
log Tenurei,t -0.94 0.44 0.05 -0.90 0.49 0.09 -0.98 0.45 0.05 -0.90 0.48 0.08
GrowthMi,t 8.52 9.09 0.36 14.68 9.15 0.13 99.85 49.03 0.06 105.58 52.35 0.06
GrowthT5Mi,t 16.41 9.08 0.09 83.39 28.38 0.01 15.15 9.63 0.14 85.72 28.47 0.01
ShareT5i,t 0.02 0.07 0.81 -0.02 0.07 0.77
ShareT5i,t ×GrowthT5Mi,t -3.14 1.36 0.04 -3.28 1.42 0.04
Y eart -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.02
Clarityi,t 2.55 3.45 0.47 2.20 3.61 0.55
Clarityi,t ×GrowthMi,t -134.92 81.17 0.12 -137.88 88.89 0.14
Intercept 113.85 34.08 0.00 102.46 36.80 0.01 2.93 2.51 0.26 2.96 2.21 0.20
R2 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16
BIC 1435 1375 1444 1383
N 225 213 225 213
N countries 15 15 15 15
Std. errors clustered Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
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